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Abstract. The current research examines the extent to which individuals endorse “sexblind” versus “sexaware” ideologies. Analogous
to colorblind and multicultural ideologies, sexblindness involves ignoring sex categorization when perceiving others, and sexawareness
involves recognizing and celebrating sex differences. Results revealed that participants endorsed sexblindness more (and, thus, sexaware-
ness less) in work than in social contexts. Further, sexblindness was correlated with an internal motivation to respond without sexism,
suggesting people perceive sexblindness as a way to reduce sexism. Consistent with this view, the more participants endorsed sexblindness
in social settings, the less benevolent sexism they harbored. The implications of sexaware and sexblind ideologies and the difference
between these ideologies and colorblind and multicultural ideologies are discussed.
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In our “men-are-from-Mars, women-are-from-Venus” cul-
ture it has become common to hear about the differences
between men and women. For example, the New York
Times recently reported about sex differences in personality
(Tierney, 2008) and in dining preferences (Bruni, 2008);
Time Magazine reported about the decreasing sex differ-
ence in math (Park, 2008); and Newsweek about differences
in stress levels (Kantrowitz & Wingert, 2008). In contrast
to this tendency of the press to acknowledge – or even em-
phasize – sex differences, laws and court precedents pro-
hibit treating women and men differently in employment
settings. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on sex,
and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibits sex-based wage
discrimination for men and women who perform equal
work in the same organization. In an effort to avoid dis-
crimination, therefore, employers may be motivated to ig-
nore sex differences among their employees. The present
research examines the extent to which individuals believe
that, for the goal of equality, sex differences should be em-
phasized; or whether they believe that sex categories (and
differences) should be ignored.
Our examination builds upon research on models of ra-
cial diversity. Social scientists and policymakers have for-
warded two fundamentally different approaches to the re-
duction of interracial/interethnic tension and stratification.
Colorblindness proposes that the use of racial categories
should be eliminated when perceiving and making judg-
ments of others, and that instead we should judge and treat
one another as individuals (Lipset, 1996). The other ap-
proach, multiculturalism, proposes that we should ac-
knowledge and celebrate group differences, creating great-
er awareness and understanding of differential group expe-
riences and an appreciation of both similarities and
differences between groups (Takaki, 1993; Yinger, 1994).
Although these ideologies have typically focused on eth-
nic/racial diversity, they may also be relevant as a way of
reducing sexism and increasing gender equality. We define
a sexblind ideology as the view that, in order to increase
equality, the use of sex categories should be eliminated and
everyone should be treated as an individual, whereas a sex-
aware ideology maintains that one should acknowledge
and appreciate sex differences.1
We want to emphasize that these ideologies are different
from other concepts related to gender. Sexblindness and
sexawareness are lay theories about how to treat sex cate-
gories in order to reduce sexism and increase equality. The
ideologies presume sex differences exist, but are not con-
cerned with people’s perceptions of the sources of the dif-
ferences. Thus, these ideologies are different than sexism,
DOI: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000026
 We use the term sex to denote the grouping of people into female and male categories. The terms sex differences and sex similarities describe
the results of comparing these two groups and the term sexblind indicates that biological sex categories are being ignored. Conversely,
sexaware indicates that sex categories are being acknowledged. Of course, once sex categories are acknowledged, the meanings that societies
and individuals ascribe to these female and male categories (gender) also becomes relevant. We did use the term “gender” in the questionnaire
because it is more common than “sex” in lay language and because we did not expect our participants to understand the difference in our
usage of the two terms.
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which deals with evaluations of men and women; and es-
sentialism, which states that gender groups are biologically
fixed and unchangeable, and that there are deep and un-
changing properties that define the group (Haslam, Roth-
schild, & Ernst, 2000).2
Although the race and sex ideologies are similar concep-
tually, lay thinking about racial and sex categories and
these ideologies may differ in a number of ways. Although
colorblindness is endorsed more than multiculturalism
among White Americans (Plaut, 2002), there are several
reasons why sexawareness may be a more popular belief
than sexblindness. For instance, people believe that men
and women are different in fundamental ways that stem
from deep, unchanging properties of each sex (Prentice &
Miller, 2006, 2007), and that sex differences are due more
to biology than are racial differences (Martin & Parker,
1995). In addition, women and men have daily contact with
one another, are interdependent within family units (see
Fiske & Stevens, 1993), and their interactions often involve
complementary roles that emphasize gender and sex differ-
ences. Contact between men and women is also necessary
for reproduction. The same cannot be said for racial groups.
Finally, because sexist behavior is not always perceived as
negatively as racist behavior (see Fiske & Stevens, 1993;
Rudman & Glick, 2008) and does not lead to the same lev-
els of guilt as racist behavior (Czopp & Monteith, 2003),
people may not be motivated to avoid using sex categories
as a strategy for appearing nonbiased, as has been shown
for race (Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely,
2006). In fact, people believe there would be more negative
consequences if scientists do not report a sex difference
when it really exists than if they falsely report one that does
not exist (Martin & Parker, 1995). Taken together, this
work suggests that the societal forces that have promoted
colorblindness as a strategy for avoiding racial bias may
not translate to the case of sex and sexism. Rather, people
may endorse sexawareness more than sexblindness.
Although we predict that sexawareness will be endorsed
more than sexblindness, it is likely that their differential
endorsement will be context-dependent; thus, we assessed
people’s ideological endorsement when thinking about
work or social situations. People may be particularly likely
to categorize by sex (or its correlate, gender) in social set-
tings where the relevance of sex is more obvious, such as
within families and romantic relationships or for reproduc-
tion. In contrast, sexblindness may be endorsed more in
work settings. Indeed, the workplace has been the primary
site of concern about sexism and the focus of laws designed
to curtail gender discrimination. Similar to the reasoning
often underlying colorblindness – that failure to categorize
a person by race makes racial bias impossible – motivation
to avoid gender discrimination in the workplace may en-
courage a sexblind ideology.
If people believe that sexblindness is a way to avoid
sexism, then people who are more motivated to avoid sex-
ism should also be more likely to endorse the sexblind ide-
ology. The idea that sexblindness may be a way to reduce
sexism is also paralleled by the writings of early feminist
empiricist researchers who emphasized the similarities be-
tween women and men as a way to increase equality (see
Eagly, 1995). Indeed, research has found a positive corre-
lation between colorblindness and external motivation to
respond without prejudice (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Nor-
ton, 2008), and we expect a similar relation between sex-
blindness and motivation to respond without sexism. To
assess this hypothesis, participants completed the internal
and external motivation to respond without sexism scales
(Klonis, Plant, & Devine, 2005) as well the sexblind versus
sexawareness ideology scale.
In addition to exploring the relations among sexblind-
ness, sexawareness, and motivation to respond without sex-
ism, the present work also considered the relations between
these ideologies and sexist beliefs. Specifically, we as-
sessed participants’ hostile and benevolent attitudes toward
women with the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick &
Fiske, 1996). Hostile sexism is the traditional type of sex-
ism measured as negative attitudes toward women. Benev-
olent sexism, on the other hand, is an attitude toward wom-
en that is subjectively positive but still sexist because it is
stereotypical and limits women to traditional roles. In the
race bias literature, multicultural ideologies have been as-
sociated with lower race prejudice (Neville, Lilly, Duran,
Lee, & Browne, 2000; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2003) but
higher stereotyping (Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink,
2000), compared with colorblindness. Given these find-
ings, one might predict that sexblindness would be associ-
ated with greater sexism. If sexblindness is related to the
motivation to avoid sexism, however, it is possible that sex-
blindness will actually be associated with lower sexism,
relative to sexawareness. This study provides initial evi-




Participants were students from two different geographical
areas. Sample 1 consisted of 17 men and 45 women with a
mean age of 19.40 (SD = 1.34) from a large urban area in
the Midwest, 56.5% of whom were European American,
19.4% Hispanic/Latino, 11.3% Asian/Asian American,
8.0% African American, and 4.8% other or multiracial.
Sample 2 consisted of 37 men and 112 women with a mean
 A separate sample of students (14 men and 45 women) completed both the sexblind versus sexaware items (without reference to a specific
context) and scales measuring the essentialist qualities of men and women (including the degree to which categories are understood as natural
kinds and as coherent entities; Haslam et al., 2000). There were no significant correlations between the scales (all ps > .48). Thus, we have
initial empirical evidence that the sexblind ideology scale measures something different from essentialism.
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age of 19.21 (SD = 2.05) from the Southwest, 63.8% of
whom were European American, 10.7% Hispanic/Latino,
2.0% Asian/Asian American, 2.7% African American, and
20.8% other or multiracial. Most students were recruited
through research participation pools in their introductory
psychology course, although 40 participants from Sample
1 were recruited in a classroom setting. Although Sample
2 (M = 3.66, SD = 0.74) had higher overall mean sexblind-
ness versus sexawareness score than Sample 1 (M = 3.47,
SD = 0.65), the sample did not significantly interact with
any other variables in the design. Thus, we combined the
two samples for the sexblind scale analyses.
Materials
Sexblind Versus Sexaware Scale
A 12-item scale was created to assess sexblind versus sex-
aware ideologies, consisting of 6 items written to assess
sexblindness and 6 to assess sexawareness, on 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scales (see Appendix A for
the full scale). The items were chosen from a larger pool
of items which were written by the authors to represent the
ideas of sexblindness and sexawareness. Some items were
modeled after either Neville et al.’s (2000) colorblind racial
attitudes scale or other items we have used in the past to
measure colorblindness. For example, the colorblind item
we have used in past research stating that “Recognizing
racial/ethnic differences undermines social cooperation
and progress” became “Recognizing differences between
men and women undermines social cooperation and pro-
gress” and the multicultural item “It is important to recog-
nize a person’s race/ethnicity in order to fully appreciate
the person” became “It is important to recognize a person’s
gender in order to fully appreciate who the person is.” The
sexaware items were reverse-scored before the average re-
sponse to all 12 items was calculated (α = .74 for the work
context; α = .76 for the social context).3 Thus, higher
means indicate greater endorsement of sexblindness and
lesser endorsement of sexawareness, with a midpoint of 4
indicating equal endorsement.
Work and Social Context
For the work context, participants were asked to answer the
items with a professional or work/employment environ-
ment in mind and to think about people in employment
settings as they responded. For the social context, partici-
pants were asked to answer the items with social interac-
tions in mind and to think about social settings as they re-
sponded. Phrases such as “in the workplace” and “in social
situations” were also embedded within each item. The sex-
blind versus sexaware ideology scales in the work and so-
cial contexts were correlated, r(209) = .60, p < .001.
Motivation to Respond Without Sexism
Participants in Sample 2 also completed the Motivation to
Respond Without Sexism Scale (MRWSS; Klonis et al.,
2005), which consists of 6 items measuring internal moti-
vation to respond without sexism (e.g., “I am personally
motivated by my beliefs to be nonsexist” and “I attempt to
act in nonsexist ways because it is personally important to
me”; α = .81; M = 5.30, SD = 1.05) and 6 items measuring
external motivation to respond without sexism (e.g., “I at-
tempt to appear nonsexist in order to avoid disapproval
from others” and “I try to act in nonsexist ways because of
pressure from others”; α = .89, M = 3.12, SD = 1.23). Items
were answered on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Internal and external motivations were
not significantly correlated, r(147) = –.01, p = .91.
Sexism
Sample 2 participants also completed the Ambivalent Sex-
ism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996), which consists
of 11 items measuring benevolent sexism (e.g., “In a disas-
ter, women ought to be rescued before men” and “Women,
compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibili-
ty”; α = .87; M = 3.74, SD = 1.08) and 11 items measuring
hostile sexism (e.g., “Women seek to gain power by getting
control over men” and “When women lose to men in a fair
competition, they typically complain about being discrim-
inated against”; α = .89; M = 3.72, SD = 1.13). Items were
answered on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strong-
ly agree). Hostile and benevolent sexism were positively
correlated, r(147) = .54, p < .001, and thus we used each
scale as a covariate for the other when computing correla-
tions.4
Procedure and Design
Each participant completed the sexblind versus sexaware
ideology scale, once when thinking about employment set-
tings and once when thinking about social settings. The
design was a 2 (Context: work, social) × 2 (Participant Sex:
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 Factor analyses of the items were not consistent across contexts and did not indicate that the sexblind and sexaware items should be separated.
In addition, the alphas for separate 6 item scales were lower than the combined scales. For the combined scales, reliability analyses indicated
that removing items never increased either α more than .01.
 There were no significant sex differences in internal, t(147) = 0.53, p = .60, or external, t(147) = 0.23, p = .82, motivation to respond without
sexism or in the hostile, t(147) = 0.79, p = .43, and benevolent, t(147) = 1.24, p = .22, sexism scales. Because there were no sex differences,
correlations between these scales and endorsement of sexblind versus sexaware ideology were calculated on the sample as a whole.
male, female) × 2 (Order: work context first, social context
first) mixed-model factorial, with context as a within-sub-
jects variable. After completing the ideology scale, partic-
ipants in Sample 2 completed the MRWSS and ASI.5 Par-
ticipants in both samples completed all items after finishing
other studies that were unrelated to perceptions of sex dif-
ferences.
Results and Discussion
Sexblind Versus Sexaware Ideology
Average ideology ratings were subjected to a 2 (Context:
work, social) × 2 (Participant Sex: male, female) × 2 (Or-
der: work context first, social context first) mixed-model
analysis of variance. Results revealed a main effect of con-
text, indicating that participants endorsed sexblindness
more (and sexawareness less) in work settings (M = 3.96,
SD = 0.80) than in social settings (M = 3.25, SD = 0.81),
F(1, 207) = 140.91, p < .001. No other effects were signif-
icant, all p values > .11. One-sample t-tests comparing
scores on the sexblind ideology scale to the scale’s mid-
point (i.e., 4) indicated that agreement with the items was
not different from the midpoint in work contexts, t(210) =
–0.67, p = .50, indicating equal endorsement of sexblind
and sexaware ideologies. However, agreement was signif-
icantly lower than the midpoint in the social context,
t(210) = –13.55, p < .001, indicating significant endorse-
ment of a sexaware ideology. Thus, as predicted, partici-
pants endorsed sexblindness more (and sexawareness less)
in work than social contexts and also endorsed sexaware-
ness more strongly than sexblindness in the social context.
Sexblind Ideology and Sexism
As shown in Table 1, the more internally motivated to con-
trol their sexist responses participants were, the more likely
they were to endorse the sexblind ideology in both the so-
cial and work contexts. These correlations suggest that in-
dividuals may, indeed, construe sexblindness as a way to
reduce sexism. Contrary to Apfelbaum et al. (2008), exter-
nal motivation to respond without sexism was not signifi-
cantly correlated with the ideology scales, suggesting that
it is a personal commitment to equality, and not just con-
cern over outward appearances, that is associated with
greater endorsement of the sexblind perspective. Thus,
concerned about being sexist, but not concerns about ap-
pearing sexist, seem to be associated with the adoption of
a sexblind ideology.
The results also revealed interesting correlations be-
tween scores on the sexblindness scale and those on the
sexism inventory. Specifically, benevolent sexism was
negatively correlated with the endorsement of sexblind-
ness in the social setting, indicating that people who en-
dorsed sexblindness more (and, thus, sexawareness less)
expressed less benevolent sexism. Although the correla-
tion with benevolent sexism in the work context was also
negative, it was not statistically significant. Similarly,
correlations between sexblind ideology endorsement and
hostile sexism were nonsignificant (see Table 1). Al-
though the result that sexblindness is related to lower bias
expression seems inconsistent with research in the racial
domain, in which colorblindness has been associated
with greater expression of bias (Neville et al., 2000; Ri-
cheson & Nussbaum, 2003), it likely reflects facets of the
benevolent sexism scale. Specifically, benevolent sexism
stems from positive, but stereotypical, views of tradition-
al women. Thus, people scoring higher on sexblindness
in the present study expressed views of women that were
less stereotypical, which is consistent with Wolsko et
al.’s (2000) finding that colorblindness was associated
with less stereotyping than multiculturalism. Because the
ASI does not distinguish between evaluative reactions
and stereotype endorsement and because benevolent sex-
ism contains positive (albeit stereotypical) views of
women, it remains unclear how sexblindness is related to
gender prejudice. Future research should examine this is-
sue with other measures of prejudice and stereotyping. In
addition, given that sexblindness was only reliably cor-
related with benevolent sexism in the social context, fu-
ture research should explore the relation between sex-
blind and sexaware ideologies and sexism in the work-
place – one of the more prevalent domains of gender
discrimination. In sum, the current results are only a first
step in addressing the question of which ideology will
promote gender equality under what circumstances.
It will also be important for future research to examine
the meanings that different people ascribe to these ideol-
ogies. For some, sexblindness may be seen as a way to
reduce prejudice, but for others, it may be a way to main-
Table 1. Correlations between the sexblind versus sexaware
scale and motivation to respond without sexism




Internal External Hostile Benevolent
Work context .36*** –.02 –.01 –.12
Social context .40*** –.09 .02 –.21*
Note. n = 149. For the sexblind/sexaware ideology scale, higher scores
indicate greater endorsement of sexblindness and lesser endorsement
of sexawareness. 1Correlations with ambivalent sexism were partial
correlations, covarying for the other sexism scale. *p < .05. **p < .01.
***p < .001.
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 Participants also completed the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), but it was not correlated
with sexblind ideology.
tain the current gender hierarchy and division of labor
(i.e., ignoring category boundaries means gender dispar-
ities and discrimination cannot be addressed; see
Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009). Clearly, dif-
ferent meanings of sexblindness will be associated with
differential levels of sexism.
Limitations
We would be remiss not to mention the somewhat low re-
liability of the sexblind versus sexaware scales as a caveat
to the current results. The results should be replicated with
more reliable scales, although many of the effects demon-
strated here are quite large, despite potential issues of reli-
ability. Another limitation of the research is that partici-
pants simply imagined the setting as they answered the
questions, rather than giving their opinions while actually
in a particular context. It would be interesting to measure
sexblind and sexaware ideologies while people are in work
and social settings in order to see if people shift their per-
spective naturally.
Future research should also address sex differences in
these ideologies. There were few men in the current sam-
ple, which may have contributed to the lack of sex differ-
ences in the scales. A larger, more balanced sample of male
and female participants may show sex differences in sex-
ism as well as ideology endorsement. For example, mem-
bers of minority groups endorse multiculturalism more
than majority members (Plaut, 2002; Verkuyten, 2005). It
is possible that similar differences could emerge for men
and women.
Overall, the idea that people may be sexblind or sex-
aware is a new concept with intriguing implications for sex-
ism, as well as the contextual nature of how men and wom-
en are treated in society. The current research is a first step
in assessing when and why individuals may endorse these
ideologies. Our results indicate that people endorse the sex-
blind notion that sex categories should be ignored more
(and the sexaware ideology that sex differences should be
acknowledged and celebrated less) in a work than social
context. In addition, endorsing a sexblind ideology was re-
lated to lower benevolent sexism (especially in social set-
tings) and a greater concern to avoid being sexist. Future
research should continue to explore the contextual nature
of these ideologies and the causal relationship between the
ideologies and sexism.
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Appendix A
1. There is no reason to categorize individuals as men or
women.
2. Both men and women have unique assets to contrib-
ute.*
3. We need to recognize and celebrate the cultural differ-
ences between men and women in order to create an
equal society.*
4. We should describe others in terms of their individual
traits rather than their gender.
5. Recognizing differences between men and women un-
dermines social cooperation and progress.
6. Clothing and hairstyles for men and women should be-
come indistinguishable.
7. The differences between men and women should be
acknowledged and celebrated.*
8. It is important to recognize a person’s gender in order
to fully appreciate who the person is.*
9. We should adjust our behavior when interacting with
men versus women because men and women are dif-
ferent.*
10. Talking about differences between men and women
causes unnecessary tension.
11. It’s okay to treat men and women differently.*
12. We should try not to notice or think about whether an
individual is male or female.
*These items are sexaware items and were reverse-scored.
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